Nowadays, Bitcoin and Proof-of-Work blockchain systems are becoming prominent and incorporated in many applications and multi-agent systems. Despite their wide applications, the security of such systems is not entirely guaranteed even if half of the total hash rate is held by nonmalicious miners. Particularly, Selfish mining strategy [2] which could disrupt the economy of Bitcoin mining has not been studied in the context of multiple miners. Our empirical investigation extends the original study by accounting for multiple Selfish miners (who always use Selfish mining strategy) and multiple strategic miners (who choose a mining strategy to maximise their individual mining reward.) We show that the number of miners in the system is as important as the distribution of hash rate among miners and Selfish mining can be prevented in the presence of multiple miners.
Introduction
Blockchain is used to securely record a ledger of Bitcoin transactions amongst Internet users [1] . The great success of Bitcoin and Blockchain is based on an application of a cryptographic puzzle, namely Proof-of-Work, and the economic incentive for miners who are the underlying workforce of Bitcoin system. Clearly, it is important to recompensate every miner in proportion to their individual computational effort in order to sustain the system and its cryptocurrency.
Due to Nakamoto's analysis, it has been widely believed that Bitcoin and similar systems will remain secure and sustainable as long as at least a half of the total hash rate in the system is held by non-malicious miners [1] . Such miners who always follow the protocol to create new blocks will prevent a forking attack, where a part of a blockchain is overwritten by malicious miner's blocks.
However, Selfish mining (SM) strategy allows a malicious miner who possesses at least one-third of the total hash rate to successfully fork the blockchain [2] . Essentially, SM strategy uses an information hiding technique to periodically gain an advantage over the other miners. With a larger amount of hash rate, SM strategy will become even more effective and fork the blockchain more frequently. As a consequence, an SM miner receives their mining reward higher than they should, and other miners will receive lower reward in turn. In the worst scenario, the mining economy will collapse due to the disrupted distribution of mining reward.
Despite such a threat, there is yet no research on the SM strategy simultaneously used by multiple miners. To the best of our knowledge, most investigations so far focused on a system with one malicious miner using SM strategy and the others mining according to the protocol [2, 4, 3, 6, 5] . In practice, multiple miners in Bitcoin system could use SM strategy at the same time. Whether SM strategy is even more effective in such situation is yet unknown.
For this reason, we carried out an empirical investigation on SM strategy in the context of multiple miners. Particularly, we seek to know (a) the amount of hash rate that SM strategy requires to frequently fork the blockchain and earn mining rewards more than it should, and (b) the amount of hash rate that nonmalicious miners require to prevent SM strategy. This knowledge is important for Bitcoin community and developers of Blockchain systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Firstly, a literature review related to our study is presented. We then describe our models of Bitcoin system and relevant concepts for our work. Subsequently, our empirical results are described and discussed. We finally conclude this paper with our findings and future work.
Related Work
After Eyal and Sirer's seminal work [2] , a number of studies have advanced the research of SM strategy. For an example, some studies proposed an optimised variant of SM strategy [3, 6] . Moreover, a combination of SM strategy with other attacks was studied [6] . As a consequence, the amount of hash rate required by SM strategy became even less than 1 3 of the total hash rate in the system. Despite many improvements of Bitcoin protocol proposed to prevent against the SM strategy, their methods are difficult to carry out in practice [5] . In particular, the improved protocols raise the amount of hash rate that SM strategy requires up to certain degree. However, they require a precise coordination among Bitcoin community to adopt the improved protocol at the same time.
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of multiple miners simultaneously employing SM strategy is not explored in the existing literature. In particular, current work so far only studied SM or similar strategies under a system of one malicious miner and one non-malicious miner [2, 3, 6, 5] . Since there are many miners in the practical systems, it is important to investigate how SM strategy will perform in a context of multiple miners that might individually employ SM strategy.
Models of the Bitcoin System
In this section, we formally define two models of Bitcoin system where the difference between them is a miner's capability of choosing a mining strategy. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the system has:
1. A fully connected network of Bitcoin miners without communication delay,
2. An equal amount of Bitcoin reward to the creator of the block for every block in the blockchain, and 3. The same computational difficulty (the target hash value) for every block in the blockchain.
These assumptions are important for us to focus on our aim of the investigation. We consider two mining strategies: namely Honest mining (HM) and Selfish mining (SM). The HM strategy corresponds to the Bitcoin mining protocol where a miner always mines a new block from the last block of the longest blockchain. On the other hand, the SM strategy is one that strategically hides and publishes its new block in order to privately mine the block by themselves and overwrites other miners' blocks [2] . An algorithm of Selfish mining is presented in Algorithm 1.
Consequently there are three types of miners: Honest miner, Selfish miner, and Strategic miner. Honest miner and Selfish miner use HM and SM respectively; henceforth HM and SM will also be used to denote them. In contrast, Strategic miner (StrM) is a miner that chooses a strategy, either HM or SM strategy, to maximise their mining reward. StrM will be referred later in the second model where we consider the miner is capable of choosing their strategy.
Fixed Strategy Mining Model
We modeled the Bitcoin mining process where every miner employs a fixed mining strategy as a Markov process M = (I, C, P, S, È(·) , Í(·)).
• I = {1, 2, ..., N } is the collection of all miners denoted by numbers.
• C = (c i |c i ∈ {HM, SM} , i ∈ I) is a list of miner's mining strategies where its i-th element is a mining strategy used by i-th miner in I.
• P = p i |p i ∈ [0, 1] , i∈I p i = 1, i ∈ I is a tuple of miner's mining powers where its i-th element is an amount of mining power of i-th miner in I. In other words, P is a power allocation of the system and each mining power p i ∈ P represents a proportion of the miner's hash rate in the Bitcoin system. • S is a set of all states in the Markov process where its element s ∈ S is a state of blockchain. Note that the initial state s 0 ∈ S represents the blockchain with only the 1st block.
• È(·) is a state transition probability mass function where È(s t+1 |s t ) = p i , and the next state s t+1 is simply the current state s t but includes the new block created by miner i. In other words, a transition from s t to s t+1 represents a miner's discovery of a new block.
• Í(·) is a utility function Í : I × S → [0, 1] that computes a proportion of miner's blocks in the longest blockchain. In other words, the value of Í(s,i) is i-th miner's mining reward given a state of the blockchain s ∈ S.
where b i is a total amount of i-th miner's blocks in the longest blockchain s. Intuitively, Í(s,i) will converge given a sufficiently large time in this Markov model.
Dynamic Strategy Mining Model
We modeled the Bitcoin mining where every miner except the HM individually chooses their mining strategy to maximise their individual mining reward as an empirical normal-form game. With the game theoretical analysis, we account for a change of SM's mining strategy when they deem it is better off to use HM under some power allocations. Specifically, we extended the previous model such that SM becomes StrM who decides on their mining strategy given a perfect information of the other miners' strategies and all possible mining rewards that the StrM receives.
Formally, an empirical normal-form game of mining process is denoted by
′ (·)} where I and P are the same as those in the previous model and the others are described as follows.
is a list of miner's types where its i-th element indicate whether an i-th miner in I is Honest miner or Strategic miner.
• (·) is a function that maps a type of miner to a valid set of strategies.
(c
A strategy profile is simply denoted as A = (a i , a −i ) = (a i |a i ∈ (c i ) , c ′ i ∈ C, i ∈ I) where a −i collectively denotes strategies of all miners except for i-th miner.
• 
Power Threshold, Safety Level and Equilibrium
As mentioned in Section 1, we are interested in the mining power that a SM/StrM requires to earn an unfairly large amount of mining reward and the mining power that a collective of all HM requires to prevent such unfair earnings. In details, an unfairly large mining reward in our models is one that exceeds the mining power that a miner possesses. Originally, a system in the long run where everyone is HM will allocate each miner a mining reward equal to their mining power (since there is only one block generated at each period and everyone mines from the latest block.) However, a miner with sufficiently high mining power can use SM and gain their mining reward higher than their mining power.
In our result analysis and discussion, we will look for a power threshold which is the least mining power that allows a SM/StrM to always earn their unfairly large mining reward independently of how much mining power the others possess.
Definition 1 GivenP (p) the set of all possible power allocations with any HM/StrM having mining power p, and Í p,P the mining reward of any SM/StrM miner with mining power p in a power allocation P , a power threshold β is one that satisfies the condition below.
Similarly, we also look for a safety level which is the least mining power of a collective of all HM that prevents all SM/StrM from earning their unfairly large mining reward. Once the safety level is reached, no SM/StrM will be able to gain mining reward more than they should.
Definition 2 Given I
′ the set of all SM/StrM miners and Í i,pi the mining reward of an i-th miner with mining power p i , a safety level γ is one that satisfies the condition below.
where p HM is a mining power of the Honest miner.
In the dynamic strategy mining model (Section 3.2), we will retrieve an outcome of the game prior to an analysis of the safety level and the power threshold. In particular, we will use the concept of pure-strategy ǫ-equilibrium (PSNE) to derive miner's strategy choice that maximises their mining reward. The concept is also useful to disregard a small fluctuation in the payoff value; such a fluctuation is caused by a randomness element in the mining process and consequently could make us misinterpret the result.
Definition 3 A pure-strategy ǫ-Nash equilibrium (PSNE) where ǫ > 0 is a strategy profile A * = (a * i , a −i ) that satisfies the following condition:
Finally, an extra assumption where HM is more preferable to SM will be incorporated in the PSNE analysis of the result. In the next section, we will 
Parameter
Value Power step for 1,2,3 SM/StrM 0.01 for 4 SM/StrM 0.02 for 5,6,7 SM/StrM 0.04 for 8,9 SM/StrM 0.05 ǫ 0.0001
Empirical Results and Discussion
To address our research question, we carried out discrete event simulations of the models with different parameters such that different numbers of SM/StrM in the system and different power allocations are accounted. Each simulation parameter was also repeated 100 times to compute an average utility value after convergence. In the case of non-convergence, we used the value after 200,000 timesteps which is analogous to 3-4 years in the Bitcoin system. Note that there can be multiple events (e.g. a number of broadcasts by multiple SM) in each simulation timestep. Unless specified otherwise, each event was sequentially processed in a uniformly random manner.
Due to the very large number of simulations required, we carried out simulations only for the base settings and performed permutation to cover all results. For example, we used the converged utility values of the model M 1 with C 1 = (HM, SM) and P 1 = (0.4, 0.6) for the model M 2 where C 2 = (SM, HM) and P 2 = (0.6, 0.4). We also treated a collective of HM as one HM in our simulation since we do not refer to their individual earning and an overall outcome of their individual mining in our models is the same as a mining done by one HM with their combined mining powers.
Fixed Strategy Mining
In general, the mining power of SM and HM that yields an unfairly large mining reward decreases with the number of SM in the system. As shown in 1(a), the mean of SM's mining reward among different power allocations exponentially grows in an increase of SM's mining power until its convergence at unity. However, the range of SM's mining power during the exponential growth gradually decreases with the number of SM. Similar trend of the HM's mining reward with respect to the HM's mining power is observed and shown in Figure  1 (b) as well. Note that HM can earn an unfairly large mining reward in some cases too. Further examination of the results showed an underlying cause of the trends of HM/SM's mining rewards. Generally, the higher the number of miners, the less mining power each of them has. With low mining power, SM is less likely to create a private chain longer than the other chain and therefore most of their computational resources are wasted. Therefore, the significant amount of mining power that a SM or HM requires to earn an unfairly large mining reward become less in a large number of miners in the system. Surprisingly, a number of SMs can simultaneously get their unfairly large mining reward under some power allocations. In particular, their mining power in the power allocation are nearly the same mining power and larger than certain value. The range of such mining power also decreases in an increase of the number of SM. Due to space limitation, we cannot visually show the range of the mining power.
Dynamic Strategy Mining
We first noticed multiple PSNE for some particular power allocations and one PSNE for every power allocation in every number of StrM in the system. As shown in Figure 2(a) , the average number of PSNE per power allocation is always at least one. However it becomes extremely large in power allocations with a StrM whose mining power is relatively high. Further observation showed that the large number of PSNE is caused by a StrM with low mining power in power allocations where there is another StrM whose mining power is superlatively high. In such power allocations, there is no significant difference of mining reward between HM and SM strategy used by StrM with low mining power; which results in a slightly moderate amount of StrM's SM over all PSNE as depicted in Figure 2(c) . Consequently, the number of PSNE will simply be a combinatorial number of the StrM's HM/SM with low mining power and therefore grows in an increase of the number of StrM as shown in Figure 2(a) .
With the HM-preference assumption (Definition 3), a reasonable choice of StrM's strategy in PSNE was obtained. In particular, StrM will no longer choose SM strategy if there is no significant difference between HM's and SM's mining reward under the same strategy profile and the same power allocation. The change of strategy in PSNE is clearly demonstrated by a comparatively low average number of PSNE per power allocation in Figure 2 (b) and no SM strategy chosen by StrM with mining power under 0.3 in Figure 2(d) .
Intuitively, a StrM is more likely to choose SM strategy as their mining power increases to enjoy an unfairly large mining reward. This speculation is confirmed in Figures 2(d) and 3(a) . That is, a StrM whose mining power is no larger than 0.25 always chooses HM for any number of StrM. The mining reward of such StrM converges toward the same value of their mining power as the number of StrM in the system increases. However, a StrM will choose SM strategy and earns all mining reward once they possesses at least a half of the total mining power.
Interestingly, the more StrM in the system, the more the StrM's choice of mining strategy and their mining reward becomes similar to the case of single StrM. As demonstrated in Figure 2(d) , when the number of StrM increases, the transition of the StrM's strategy from HM to SM gradually becomes sharper similarly to the case of a single StrM. Likewise, Figure 3(a) shows a convergence of the mining reward of the StrM whose mining power lower than a half to one of the case of single StrM.
In contrast, the HM's mining reward does not converge to one in the case of a single StrM, but it converges to their mining power as the number of StrM increases. This is depicted in Figure 3(b) , where the HM's mining reward of HM's mining power under 0.67 becomes more correspondent to the mining power with an increase of the number of StrM in the system.
Even with the HM-preference assumption, there also are multiple PSNE for some particular power allocations. Such multiple PSNE are shown in Figure  2(b) where an average number of PSNE per power allocation is more than unity for the StrM's mining power ranging up to 0.36. Our observation found out that multiple StrM with nearly the same mining power larger than 0.3 together choose either HM or SM in such PSNE. In such PSNE, an individual deviation from HM to SM or vice versa yields a comparatively low mining reward for the deviating StrM. Therefore, a PSNE with such StrM together choosing HM or SM are formed.
With further inspection, the existence of multiple SM chosen by StrM in such PSNE becomes more limited and less likely to occur as the number of StrM increases. Comparing to the fixed strategy model's, the range of mining power of multiple SM in this model is even lesser. Due to space limitation, we cannot visually show the range of the mining power under this model.
Safety Level and Power Threshold
As shown in Figure 4 , HM requires less mining power to prevent SM/StrM from earning their unfairly large mining reward when the number of SM/StrM in the system grows. The underlying explanation of the monotonic decrease of safety level against SM/StrM is as follows.
1. As discussed in Section 5.1, SM with low mining power frequently wastes their effort on their private chain which is unlikely to be longer than the other chains. Consequently, the safety level against SM, or the mining power required by HM to prevent SM, becomes lower with an increase of the number of SM.
2. Since StrM with low mining power choose HM (Section 5.2), the combined power of miners who use HM strategy in the system becomes larger and consequently the HM miner requires less mining power. With an increase of the number of StrM in the system, the number of StrM with low mining power who will choose HM will also increase and the safety level against StrM will further decrease.
Moreover, the safety level against SM/StrM is bounded by one in the case of 1 SM/StrM; that is, it is no greater than 0.67. Intuitively, the case of 1 SM/StrM can be considered as the most difficult for HM to prevent since it is a coalition of all SM/StrM combining their mining power and working together. The safety level in this scenario is therefore the highest one in all cases of number of SM/StrM. Similarly, the least mining power required by SM/StrM to earn an unfairly large mining reward become lesser in an increase of the number of SM/StrM. In particular, Figure 4 shows the monotonic decrease of the power threshold of SM/StrM after the case of single SM/StrM. The explanation is similar to above and goes as follows.
1. A group of SM in the system will possess less mining power if the number of SM increases. Since SM with low mining frequently waste their effort by trying to create a private chain that is unlikely to be long enough (Section 5.1), the least amount of mining power to frequently create a private chain longer than the others will become lower.
2. In a similar manner, the mining power of many StrM will decrease as the number of StrM in the system increases. Since StrM with low mining power choose HM (Section 5.2), the system dynamic is analogous to a system with 1 StrM. Although Figure 3 (a) directly confirms our analysis, Figure 3 (b) does not since it does not take account of StrM that use HM.
As shown in Figure 4 , an upper bound of the power threshold of SM/StrM can be found from the case of 2 or 3 SM/StrM; that is, a half of the total mining power. The underlying explanation is intuitive; we consider a system with two SM/StrM who hold most of the total mining power and the rest including HM holds a negligible amount of mining power. In such a case, it is mainly a competition between the two SM/StrM to create the longest private chain, and a SM/StrM needs approximately half of the total mining power to win.
Conclusion
In this work, an empirical investigation of Selfish mining (SM) strategy employed by multiple miners has been carried out. Since our models accounted for multiple miners, we are able to identify a case of multiple malicious miners using SM strategy and simultaneously earn their unfairly large amount of mining reward. As the number of malicious miners in the system increases, the SM strategy will become even more effective and require less mining power to obtain their mining reward more than they should. Our result indicated that the amount of mining power required to get such earnings will decrease even further than one-third as previously reported by [2] .
However, the SM strategy is comparably ineffective and less employed in the presence of a large number of strategic miners who choose to use either the Bitcoin mining protocol or the SM strategy to maximise their mining reward. Given that the distribution of mining power in Bitcoin system is publicly known, strategic miners whose mining power is not large will follow the mining protocol.
Surprisingly, non-malicious miners in a system with a large number of miners are not required to hold a large amount of mining power to prevent SM strategy. We have shown that such amount of mining power is lesser than two-third which was previously identified [2] . Therefore, it is important to have a large number of miners in the system to prevent malicious mining strategies such as SM.
A number of interesting questions remain to be further investigated. As pointed out by [2] , a network capability of the SM miner is also an important factor that affects how much this strategy could be effective. This aspect will be taken into account in our future work. Moreover, an optimal SM strategy with respect to multiple selfish miners, similar to one in [3] , is yet not known. With the optimal strategy, it remains to be seen whether our findings are still valid.
